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                                                     Abstract 
    The aim of this study is to determine the expanatory and predictive value of the two 
predominant schools of thought on state integration, namely neofunctionalism and 
liberal intergovernmentalism, of supranationalist or state-centric theory, with respect 
to the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the "Pact for the 
Euro" on March 25, 2011 in Brussels. 
    After a 14-month long period of great controversy among the supranational agents 
of the European Commission and the representatives of member states of the 
Economic and Monatery Union (EMU) during 2010, the European Council 
established a permanent mechanism, which is supposed to grant the stability of the 
common currency. On the one hand there is the ESM, which allows for a 
redistribution of funds within the EMU in order to bolster indebted member states’ 
(such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland) fiscal portfolios, and which enhances the 
automatism of early sanctions imposed by the European Commission in order to more 
effectively enforce the "convergence criteria" as formulated by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). On the other hand there is the "Pact for the Euro", which 
represents a permanent intergovernmental conference of EMU and other EU member 
states aiming for the harmonization of inner-European economic and fiscal policy. 
    This study provides for an analysis of the political process leading to the creation of 
this new piece of European legislation on the one hand, and on the other of the precise 
institutional outcome according to the two theories’ assumptions and explanatory 
mechanisms. 
    The fact, that the political process was decisively influenced by supranational 
agency as much as intergovernmental bargaing, and further, that "spillover" was 
absent, that issue-specific interests were divergent rather than convergent lead to the 
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conclusion, that both of the theories are only partly fit to account for the process as 
much as the outcome. This potential step toward de facto economic union and 
integrated fiscal policy was caused by an external shock, and can therefore hardly be 
described as incremental. Yet on the other hand, it also represents the consequence of 
an endogenous process perpetuating a compromise between the parties of the 
traditional debate among monetarists and economists, which is built on the procedural 
parallelity of immediate further monetary integration and the harmonization of inner-
European economic and fiscal policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In the year of 2010, a new chapter has been added to the history of the integration of 
European states. After great debate and controversy among the members of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which represents the very core of European 
integration, states decided to abandon fundamental rules of the existing treaty work, 
and to provide financial assistance to indebted members on the brink of insolvency. 
    A financial umbrella, a rescue fund of 500 billion Euros, was created by EMU 
members pooling state funds under the name of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF). It  was designed to not only provide funds to Greece, and later 
Ireland, but to also bolster the portfolios of Spain, and Portugal, and to safeguard the 
imperiled common currency as a whole. The total sum of the fund of EU financial 
support was raised to 700 billion Euro with the creation of the permanent European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) in March 2011. 
    The conflict, which became apparent among especially French and German 
governments over this issue represented probably the most serious stress on both 
states’ relationship since the unification of Germany in 1990. While the French 
government quickly took position alongside the European Commission for financial 
aid within the Union, the German government objected and found itself in opposition 
to the European Commission on the one hand, and the government of the decisive 
EMU member state of France on the other. 
    The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, adopted in 1996) represents the common 
framework for states’ economic performance and formulates convergence criteria 
which states are supposed to meet in order to secure the stability of the common 
currency and the economic welfare of the Union. However, the efficiency of this pact 
had been in doubt: the sanctioning mechanisms had not functioned, and convergence 
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was volatile, especially since the two most potent member states, namely Germany 
and France failed to meet criteria in 2003. During the recent Euro crisis it became 
apparent that a further integration of European economic and fiscal policy, and a 
harmonization of European economic capability across the EU would be 
indispensable in order to grant for stability and in order to preserve EMU in its 
present form. 
    The installation of a permanent mechanism to, on the one hand, support indebted 
member states through the ESM, and, on the other, to level out macroeconomic 
imbalances within the Union is a de facto step away from original EMU legislation. 
The pooling of such substantive treasure of member states for a common purpose has 
fueled renewed debate over the necessity of tightened compliance mechanisms, a 
tightened SGP, and extended delegation of national domains to EU authorities.  
    The aim of my study is to determine whether state-centric or rather supranationalist 
approaches are more fit to explain this new dynamic within the EMU.  
    In order to approach the question as to whether intergovernmentalist or 
neofunctionalist schools of thought are best fit to explain this recent European 
process, whether supranationalism or state-centrism represent the determining factors 
in this particular integrative step, I would now like to turn to an overview of those 
respective schools. 
Supranationalism 
    Supranationalism defines a genre of political thought, which identifies state 
integration as a process undermining national sovereignty and aiming to the 
establishment of a greater structure organized by authority beyond national state 
governments.  
Neofunctionalism: 
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    Neofunctionalism was initially formulated by Ernst Haas in 19581 (Leon Lindberg 
is also a renowned proponent of this supranational school of thought), and was very 
influential in the early days of European integration. 
    The theory holds that state integration is brought about by the entrepreneurship of 
supranational agents, who engage states in the pooling of sovereignty on issues of 
common interest, thereby creating continuous so-called "spillovers" to related policy 
areas, which function as a motor to integration fueled by transnational socio-
economic synergies. In consistence with the theory the idea of the "ever closer 
union"2 identified an irreversible process of states increasingly rendering sovereignty 
to supranational bodies, which take on a life and political ambitions of their own, 
while national governments incrementally lose sovereignty also due to unintended 
outcomes of previous decisions. The Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic 
Community, extending  the ECSC and Euratom to a common market,  serves as the 
most supportive piece of evidence for the claim of neofunctionalism.  
    However setbacks in the process of European integration soon led Haas to abandon 
initial assertiveness about the automatism of neofunctionalism.  
    Conceding to criticism with respect to the lack of explanatory capacity, Haas 
continued to argue for the macro-foundational value of the theory: "Neofunctionalists 
rely on the primacy of incremental decision-making over grand design"3.  He however 
acknowledges the notion, that neofunctionalism is limited with regards to precise 
measurement of successful or non-successful integration, "Neo-functionalists do not 
agree on a dependent variable"4. European supranational entrepreneurship, especially 
                                                
1 Ernst B. Haas, „The Uniting of Europe“, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958 
2 The Treaty of Rome, Rome, 1957 
3 Ernst B. Haas, „The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and 
Anguish of Pretheorizing“, International Organization 24, no 4 (1970), p. 627     
4 Haas, 1970, p. 628 
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represented institutionally by the European Commission, has played a great role in the 
process of European integration. Supranational bodies and structures, such as the 
Central European Bank (CEB), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), or also the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have assumed great significance for 
national policy makers. Yet, the history of this process also provides for much 
evidence on the great impact of member states’ individual interests. Now, after the 
Treaty of Lisbon, which represents the status of legal European integration, member 
states’ direct impact on the institutional framework and political reality of the EU 
continues to be at the center of day-to-day decision making.  
    What theory is it then, that best explains the recent and current events within EMU. 
Supranational Grand design? Or state centric procedural analysis? 
State-Centrism 
    State-Centrism refers to schools of thought which define state integration as 
institutionalized cooperation and harmonization of national policy on the basis of 
negotiation among states essentially retaining national sovereignty.  
Intergovernmentalism: 
    Intergovernmentalism was intially formulated by Stanley Hoffman5. Hoffman 
rejected the idea, that supranationalism is an automatic mechanism to integration 
caused by economic interests, and held, that states continue to control the process of 
European integration. On the grounds of the assumption, that nation states will 
continue to promote national interest and generally reject the delegation of 
sovereignty, he argued, that the integration of European security and defense policy 
would not happen. 
                                                
5 Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of 
International Politics, New York: Praeger, 1965 
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    The Three Pillar System, established by the Treaty of Maastricht confirms 
Hoffmann’s approach. While "Communities" matters involved supranational bodies, 
security, defense as much as judicial and police matters were decided upon 
exclusively by intergovernmental procedures. Very recent events and controversy 
regarding the intervention in Libya in 2011 provide evidence for the continuous 
relevance of Hoffmann’s conclusion.  
    However the central claim of state-centric scholars such as Hoffmann, that states do 
not cede sovereignty, has increasingly lost support in observable evidence, especially 
in the context of qualified majority voting (QMV) procedures within principal 
intergovernmental bodies which abolish single member states’ right to veto. QMV has 
assumed much greater scope and application since the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the 
Treaty of Lisbon in particular. About two thirds of all policy matters are decided upon 
via QMV. In addition, the significance of the European supranational judicial system 
has become quite substantial to national political processes. 
    Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism represents the result of a 
revision of intergovernmentalism as a theoretical approach to European integration. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism: 
    Moravcsik perpetuates a state-centric perspective on integrative processes, and yet 
seeks to incorporate transnational economic factors. He criticizes Haas’s lack of 
microfoundation and neofunctionalism’s lack of responsiveness to external events. He 
establishes three explanatory variables based on the proposition of Alan Milward: 
    "a) national preferences develop in response to exogenuous changes in the nature of 
issue-specific functional interdependence, b) interstate negotiation proceeds on the 
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basis of relative bargaining power, c) delegation to supranational institutions is 
designed to facilitate credible commitments."6 
    Liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to incorporate the acknowledgement of intra- 
and transnational socio-economic dynamics, which neofunctionalists identified as the 
basis for spillover effects. These dynamics, which in LI theory can be caused or by 
external or internal circumstances, determine states’ interest, and integrative outcomes 
are produced by intergovernmental negotiations. Supranational bodies, from a liberal 
intergovernmentalist point of view, represent the final product of the process, rather 
than the motor. Integration is not achieved by spillover, but rather "convergent 
interests" of negotiating states. 
    Since the introduction and extension of QMV procedures to intergovernmental 
processes within the EU, bargaining power has gained in political momentum. 
According to Moravcsik, in addition to "asymmetric interdependence"3 as a basis for 
bargaining, it has assumed new determining factors such as coalition building within 
intergovernmental bodies. 
    Although Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism has been accredited as the 
most comprehensive explanatory model for state integration, the question remains: 
    How can successful integration best be accounted for? The recent developments in 
EMU represent a formidable case in order to investigate the mechanisms at work of 
this new, potentially fundamental step in European integration, and may allow us to 
enrich the conversation about either supranationalism or state-centrism delivering on 
the dependent variable, which is European integration. 
                                                
6 Andrew Moravcsik, „The European Constitutional Compromise and the 
neofunctionalist legacy“, Journal of European Public Policy, no 2 (2005), p. 359 
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Research Design 
    I claim, that both theoretical approaches, neofunctionalism as much as liberal 
intergovernmentalism, are only partly fit to account for the political process leading to 
the creation of ESM on the one hand, and the precise institutional outcome on the 
other. Yet, while liberal intergovernmentalism, in this case, fails to live up to its 
promise of superior explanatory value with respect to process as much as outcome, 
neofunctionalism due to its macrofoundational understanding of the process retains a 
certain predictive value, although it partly fails to explain the process and entirely to 
predict the precise institutional outcome. 
    While the theoretic framework of this study, as outlined above, relies on seminal 
literature, I will acquire the relevant data for the research project mainly from 
newspaper articles, television news, interviews and institutions’ official publications 
as much as secondary sources, such as journal articles and books. 
    On the one hand, it will be necessary to look at data on supranational bodies’ 
involvement in the process as much as in the precise institutional design, actors such 
as the European Commission and the CEB, and on the other, data on controversial 
political processes among member states. As anticipated in the introduction, the 
process leading to the creation of ESM and "the Pact for the Euro" was greatly 
characterized by a memorable controversy within the so-called axis Paris-Berlin. The 
relationship of France and Germany had ever since the foundation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community had a central significance for the process of European 
integration, and both nations represent the greatest contributors to ESM today. 
Contrasting the positions and actions of France and Germany in the process will 
therefore be of particular interest. 
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    In Chapter 2, I will first provide an overview of the evolution of the EU’s 
institutional framework with a focus on the relation between supranational and 
intergovernmental elements determining integrative treaty work.  I will further 
provide for a brief history of EMU, which the ESM is a feature of.  
    This data will be presented with a focus on evidence on the two contrasting theories 
in preparation of the later analysis. I will then go into greater detail documenting the 
chronology of events that led to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" on 
March, 25, 2011.This substantial historical account is necessary to be able to 
understand the political process leading to the creation of ESM as much as the 
meaning of its precise institutional design.  
    In the following analysis, in Chapter 3, I will seek to interpret data according to  
key paradigms of the contrasting theories, neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentsalism: 
    I will seek to find evidence on the impact of supranational agency and national 
interests in the context of intergovernmental bargaining as determining factors on the 
creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro". I will further investigate this step in 
European integration as an incremental, endogenous  process, and/or as a reaction to 
external shocks and events. In order to accomplish this, I will find evidence on the 
explanatory mechanisms of both theories, such as on the impact of spillover, or on the 
development and impact of convergent interests on the institutional outcome.  
    This procedure should allow me to understand the dynamics of the political process 
leading to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro", and to determine in 
conclusion, whether supranationalism or state-centrism represents the best approach 
to account for the process and/or the institutional outcome. 
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                                                     Chapter 2 
Supranationalism vs State-centrism Overview Of The EU Institutional Framework 
    The institutional framework of the European Union comprises supranational as 
much as  intergovernmental elements and reflects two theoretical approaches to the 
phenomenon of state integration, namely, neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. Decision-making procedures within the EU vary according to 
the policy area in question, and the involvement of the different institutions in their 
relation to each other changes with the issue at hand. Up until the adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, supranational instititutions in general assumed their primary 
relevance with respect to issue areas that fell under what was known as the first of 
three pillars, the European Communities Pillar.  
    The first European Community was founded in 1951 among six members, namely, 
France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Italy with the Treaty of 
Paris. Modelled after the so-called "Schuman Plan", which had been formulated by 
the French foreign minister Robert Schuman, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) was created. The ECSC’s primary objective was to integrate 
French and German heavy industry along the rivers Rhine and Ruhr, which had 
represented the nucleus of French and especially German military power during the 
first half of the 20th century. The ECSC "established the institutional structure of 
European integration."7 A decision-making mechanism was desgined, that would 
consist of a supranational body comprising "administrative and political"7 functions, 
namely the High Authority (which would later become the European Commission); 
an intergovernmental body authorized to approve supranational agency, the Council 
of Minsters (today the Council); an independent supranational judicial system, the 
                                                
7 David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd & John Redmond, eds. International Organisation 
in World Politics. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 143 
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Court of Justice, to control for compliance with the treaty; and a supranational 
democratic assembly, the Common Assembly (now the European parliament), to 
supervise and provide for democratic legitimacy. 
    The Treaty of Rome in 1957 extended this supranational/intergovernmental 
decision-making mechanism, the "Communities Method," beyond the coal and steel 
industry creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). The former created a common 
market and a customs union among the community’s members, and was supposed to 
harmonize social policies. Internal tariff barriers were to be abolished step by step, 
and a common external tariff created, free movement of people and capital was 
promoted, a common transport policy was adressed, and a European investment bank 
was founded. The EAEC was also modelled after the ECSC, and represented a 
common approach to the industrialization of nuclear technology. 
    While the now three communities, namely the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom had 
shared a common Court, and Assembly, they all had their own Commission (High 
Authority), and Council. The treaty of Brussels of 1965 integrated all three 
communities and replaced the three supranational bodies as much as the three 
intergovernmental bodies with one single body respectively. 
    Yet, the early 60s had been characterized by French scepticism with respect to the 
power of supranational agency in the process of European integration.8 It was the 
Commission’s authority to initiate community policy, and the Councils conceptual 
influence was rather modest, especially once a general course of action was adopted, 
since it took unanimity to alter measures taken by the Commission. French President 
DeGaulle represents one French official, who can certainly not be described as a 
                                                
8 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003, p.558 
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supranational entrepreneur. The Fouchet plan, which was not adopted after all, 
represented the general’s proposal for a "Europe de Patries", a system of 
institutionalized intergovernmental bargaining.  
    After DeGaulle’s loss of power in 1968, which represented the beginning of a 
phase of enlargement of the EEC that would span almost 15 years, and which would 
provide great obstacles on the way to the "ever closer union", the supranational agents 
of the Commission initiated a process which was supposed to establish the so-called 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Despite sebacks with respect to monetary and 
especially economic integration, and after an intermediary, less ambitious project, 
namely the European Monetary System (EMS), EMU was revived in 1988 by the 
supranational agency of the President of the European Commission at the time, 
Jacques Delors, and the Single European Act (SEA). A single currency and a single 
market ultimately represented the core of a renewed "deepening" of the Union as 
much as of the post-Cold War process of European integration 
    The Economic and Monetary Union, which today represents the most integrated 
feature of the EU, represented an essential issue area of the first pillar of the Three 
Pillar System, as established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. EMU’s most 
exclusive supranational feature is the Central European Bank, which was also created 
with the Treaty of Maastricht, and is supposed to administer and control for the 
stability of the Euro. It was designed to be entirely independent from 
intergovernmental as much as other EU supranational bodies in order to watch 
member states’ compliance with the so-called "convergence criteria" formulated by 
the SGP.  
    The Three Pillar System organizes all policy areas  related to the completion and 
administration of the single European market through the "Community Method" of 
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decision making. As suggested above, the European commission would make 
proposals to the Council, which would vote on these issues by qualified majority vote 
(QMV, a procedure of weighted voting replacing unanimity and extended in scope 
especially with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997), and decisions would then be 
referred to the examination and assent of the European parliament. Policy initiative 
was generally the responsibility of supranational agents, the intergovernmental 
Council of member states’ ministers would have the authority to decide, and the 
supranational European parliament was consulted in order to demonstrate Democratic 
legitimacy.9  
    The other two pillars comprised foreign and defense policies on the one hand, and 
judicial and police matters on the other. Both policy areas were dealt with mostly 
intergovernmentally and with respect to foreign and defense policy by unanimous 
vote.  
    While EMU as the central feature of European integration after 1990 is strongly 
associated with supranational agency as its initiator, the Treaty of Maastricht, 
according to a study of the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo10, on 
the other hand represented the beginning of a development, that would assert the 
position of member states and the role of the intergovernmental council, and further 
enhance the position of the supranational European Parliament (EP), which since 
1979 had been elected by Europe’s population, vis-a-vis the Commission. The 
Council was given the right to initiate EU policy, which had formerly been a 
monopoly of the Commission, and the so-called co-decision procedure strengthened 
                                                
9 Europa: Gateway to the European Union, europa.eu, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index_en.htm 
10 Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, European Integration since the 1990s: 
Member States and the European Commission, University of Oslo: Centre for 
European Studies, 2004 
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the legislative influence of the EP in comparison to both, the Council, and the 
Commission. While traditionally the Commission had assumed administrative as 
much as political relevance, her political influence, meaning her opportunity for 
supranational entrepreneurship was increasingly undermined, and her administrative 
function was emphasized. 
    Intergovernmental EU summits and conferences increased in number, and the 
process leading to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 was characterized, by of course 
enlargement in Eastern Europe, and further integration of policy on an 
intergovernmental basis closely tied to democratic legitimization through the EP, and 
national parliaments. The qualified majority voting procedure was continously 
extended in scope across policy areas of the Community Pillar as much as the Judicial 
Pillar. 
    The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in 2007 and adopted in 2009, after the 
original Constitutional Treaty of Rome from 2004 had failed to be ratified by 
signatory member states, represents the status quo of the EU’s legal foundation. When 
having a close look at the central institutional innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon, its 
intergovernmentalist nature becomes apparent. An exit clause was introduced, which 
provides member states with the option to withdraw from the Union, the Council has 
been given a permanent president (28 months renewable term), and the qualified 
majority vote was not only again extended in scope, but thresholds were lowered, 
thereby extending the Council’s authority and efficiency, and member states’ sacrifice 
of national sovereignty. The traditional weighted voting procedure, which would give 
Council members different amounts of votes according to their population size was 
replaced by the so-called "double majority" voting procedure, which would require at 
least 55% of the Council’s members representing at least 67% of the Union’s 
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population in order to adopt a decision. In a case, in which the Council acts without 
initiative from the Commission, a majority of at least 72% of the Council’s members 
have to agree.11  
    While the Commission’s competencies were reduced rather than extended, an 
additional supranational body was created with respect to a common foreign and 
defense policy (CFDP). The European External Action Service (EEAS), led by the 
High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is supposed to 
promote harmonized approaches among intergovernmentally deciding member states. 
So far the success of the supranational entrepreneurship of this young agency is 
questionable, especially, as mentioned earlier, when looking at the EU’s dissonant 
reaction to the recent events in Libya. 
    I conclude this section of my study, namely an evolutionary overview of the EU’s 
institutional framework according to neofunctionalist/supranational and 
intergovernmentalist/state-centric elements, with the notion, that this data is crucial in 
order to understand the political process leading to the creation of ESM and the "Pact 
for the Euro" in March 2011. Yet, since ESM is a feature of EMU in particular, and 
since the common currency represents the key to common economic policy as it is 
sought in the Pact, I would now like to turn to a brief, but yet decently detailed 
account of the history of EMU. 
A brief history of EMU 
    The Euro as we know it today is the result of a initiative of the Commission in the 
late 80s, yet this initiative built on a contemporary historical process, that should be 
outlined in more detail.  
                                                
11 Europa: Gateway to the European Union, europa.eu,    
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index_en.htm 
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    Member states’ interest in monetary integration had already become apparent 
during the late 1960s, when the weaknesses of the Dollar, and the Bretton Woods 
system became acute. The French franc lost value, while the German mark gained.12 
    During the Hague summit in 1969 the Council created a committee to propose a 
course of action that should lead to monetary and further economic integration. While 
the result, the Werner Report, came up with a clear concept for monetary union, the 
definition of economic union remained ambigous and the debate on how to 
accomplish EMU until 1980 was characterized by two opposing positions. On the one 
hand there were the "monetarists", who held that "monetary union should be 
implemented immediately"13, and that "fixing of exchange rates...would compel 
member states to pursue complementary macroeconomic policies". This position was 
promoted by an alliance of the member states of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and 
the Commission. On the other hand there were the "economists", who said, that 
macroeconomic balancing would be the first step, since without "fixing exchange 
rates was not sustainable". This position was represented by the member states of 
Germany and the Netherlands. The EMU system, as proposed by the Werner 
committee, aimed to reduce member states’ currency fluctuations and allowed for 
limited inner-European financial aid to bolster weaker members through the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). 
    However, due to the mentioned incompleteness of, and controversy within EMU on 
the one hand, and on the other due to the global monetary crisis caused by the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the establishment of economic and 
monetary union by 1980 failed in the early 70s.  
                                                
12 R.A. Mundell, The European Monetary System 50 years after Bretton Woods: A 
Comparison Between Two Systems, Project Europe 1985-95, Siena 1994, 
http://www.columbia.edu/~ram15/ABrettwds.htm 
13 Armstrong Lloyd and Redmond, 2004, p. 163 
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    As a consequence of a Franco-German initiative the idea was revived and the 
system was replaced in 1978 by a similar, yet less ambitious model, the European 
Monetary System (EMS). The EMS incorporated the European Currency Unit (ECU), 
a weighted average of the participating currencies, the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM), which would contain bilateral currency fluctuations, and credit facilities, that 
would allow for assistance to weaker members through low-interest loans, and were 
supposed to prevent speculation.  
    The EMS was quite successful in providing for currency stability, and when 
consensus grew, that European market potential could only be fully exploited, if 
monetary integration would finally be accomplished, the SEA in 1988 established a 
three-stage-plan, which would create a common currency in Europe by 1999. 
    To this end, Article 121(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(Maastricht 1991) defined convergence criteria which represented the requirement for 
any member to join the common system. Member states were expected to keep annual 
fiscal debt below 3% of GDP and reduce gross fiscal debt to 60% of GDP. The 
guidelines represented a compromise between, monetarists and economists. The 
introduction of a common currency was paralleled by the introduction of a process to 
harmonize monetary and economic policy, and was agreed upon on the basis of a "no 
bail-out"clause, which would forbid members to support others’ fiscal debt.14 
    In 1995 the German Minister of Finance at the time Theo Waigel proposed a 
"Stability Pact for Europe", calling for automatic sanctioning in the case of a member 
state failing to meet convergence criteria from 1999 on. In 1996 the SGP was 
                                                
14 Jonas Fischer, Lars Jonung and Martin Larch, 101 Proposals to reform the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Why so many? A survey, Economic Paper, no 267, Brussels: 
European Commission, 2006 
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adopted, but again represented a compromise, and the automatism of sanctions was 
not as strict as the German government would have liked it to be.15 
    After a good start of the Euro and the SGP, first problems became apparent, when 
the global economy turned down after 9/11, and provoked doubt about the SGP’s 
efficiency in difficult times. Germany and Portugal were the first to "breach the 3% of 
GDP reference value"16. Both Germany and France failed to meet the criteria in 2004, 
and the Commission’s request for "further action" ("while at the same time 
postponing the deadline for meeting the 3% limit by one year, to 2005"), which was 
tied to the implementation of sanctions in the case of renewed failure to comply, was 
ruled out by a blocking minority of France, Germany, Italy and the UK in the 
Council. 
    On March 20, 2005, the Council of European Ministers of Finance adopted a 
reform "Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact". This new 
pact, while leaving the criteria intact, was designed to on the one hand allow for more 
flexibility and on other to improve implementation by strengthening the "preventive 
arm" of the SGP, and of the Commission as "Guardians of the Treaty". Debt to GDP 
ratios as much as "potential growth and the sustainability of public finances",17 were 
to be assessed on a country-to-country basis. The Commission was given the authority 
to make recommendations to member states in order to prevent failure to meet criteria 
without approval of the Council. However the weak corrective arm of the 
Commission was not strengthened, and over all the new Pact represented an 
enhancement of the descriptive value rather than the normative value of this piece of 
legislation. 
                                                
15 Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004, p.163 
16 Fischer, Jonung and Larch, 2006, p. 9 
17 Fischer, Jonung and Larch, 2006, p. 23 
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    Just a few weeks ago, close to 6 years after the adoption of the new Pact, member 
states’ came to adopt further alterations as concequence of EMU threatening to fail 
over all. On March 15, 2011, the Council on Economic and Financial Affairs agreed  
to the strengthening of the corrective arm of the SGP in particular. An early sanction 
mechanism would make it possible to demand a deposit of diverging member states’ 
of 0.2% of GDP already at the time an excessive budget procedure is decided upon by 
the Council, and if a recommendation of the Council to correct "the deficit is not 
followed", a fine will be automatic. The automatism of the sanctioning mechanism 
was slightly enhanced through the "reverse majority rule", which implies the 
Commission’s proposal to impose a fine to be binding, unless it is "turned down by 
the Council via qualified majority vote." Further budgetary frameworks and 
surveillance would be standardized according to EU guidelines. 
    The agreement also calls for a "broadening" of "the surveillance of the member 
states’ economic policies"18. Aiming to prevent and correct "excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances", an "excessive imbalance procedure" was introduced, 
which gives the Commission and the Council the authority to impose a "yearly fine 
equal to 0.1% of GDP" again via the "reverse majority rule". The excessive imbalance 
procedure allows for much more flexibility than the excessive budget procedure, but it 
is especially noteworthy, because, virtually for the first time, it adresses the 
implementation of economic union directly.  
    I conclude this section of my study, which provides for a historical account of 
EMU, with the notion, that all fines imposed on member states through the new 
mechanism would be pooled to assist member states in difficulty. Further, the data on 
the institutional framework of EMU and the EU as a whole as oulined above 
                                                
18 EUCO Press Release, Council reaches agreement on measures to strengthen 
economic governance, Brussels: Council of the European Union, March 15, 2011 
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according to their respective historic evolutions and theoretical foundations, is 
necessary to be able to understand the political process leading to the creation of ESM 
and "The Pact for the Euro" on March 25, 2011.  
    Before I get to determine, whether supranational or state-centrist, whether 
neofunctionalist or liberal intergovernmentalist theoretic paradigms are best fit to 
explain this deflection on the dependent variable, namely European integration, I 
would now have to provide a detailed account of the events leading to the creation of 
ESM and the related "Pact for the Euro". 
Chronology of events leading to the creation of ESM  
    I will provide a detailed chronological account of the political processes which led 
to the creation of the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) on March 25, 
2011. An examination of the role played by different EU institutions and of the 
controversial positions of member states will provide for insights into the fiber of the 
decision-making process, and relations of power within EMU and the EU as a whole. 
    On the 17th of February 2009 the European Commission published a report on the 
economic performance of 17 member states. Convergence criteria as established by 
the Treaty of Maastricht, which require member states to keep the fiscal budget deficit 
under 3% of GDP had already been violated in 2008 by France, Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Latvia and Malta. In the middle of the economic downturn that had been 
caused by the global financial crisis in 2008, and had forced European member states 
to provide substantial bail out packages to stressed national banks, the economic 
health of those countries in particular continued to suffer. The European 
Commissioner of Economic and Monetary Affairs at the time, Joaquin Almunia, 
stated that EU members were "going through a very serious crisis that is taking its toll 
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on public finances"19. Especially Ireland was anticipated to substantially exceed fiscal 
budget deficit limits by 6.5 % of GDP (a total of 9.5%), yet Almunia immediately 
suggested, that "the Commission will use the full flexibility imbedded (in EU rules), 
when considering the next steps under the excessive deficit procedure in the weeks to 
come". The convergence criteria of the SGP were primarily established to safe-guard 
the stability of the common currency, which had experienced a peak in strength in 
2007, 1.6 Dollars per Euro, and had fallen under 1.1 Dollars per Euro in late 2008. 
Violations of deficit limits, as mentioned had been occuring regularly in the past, 
however the scope of the new developments caused the European Commission to 
utter concerns "about the volatility of the exchange rate in EU countries". 
    After national elections in Greece in October 2009 the incoming government led by 
the new prime minister George Papandreou reported an anticipated budget deficit of 
12.7% of GDP. The numbers previously published by the former Greek 
administration led by Kostas Karamanlis had suggested an expected deficit of only 
5%, and grave flaws in the information politics between the EU and the member state 
of Greece became apparent. The loss of trust, and of the belief in the ability of Greece 
to consolidate her fiscal budget and to service debt, led to the down rating of Greek 
state-bonds "by two of the main rating agencies, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s"20. 
Despite temporary relaxation of the situation, due to Greece’s successful sale of bonds 
in the value of $25 billion, and a new government plan to cut the deficit, EU officials 
began considering a rescue package behind the scenes.  
    When it became apparent in the course of the following months, that the problem 
may not be solved easily, European leaders stated general will to support Greece as a 
                                                
19 Spiegel Online, „EU Concerned as Countries Violate Deficit Rules“, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,608513,00.html 
20 From the print edition, „A very European crisis“, The Economist, February 4, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15452594 
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member of EMU, however the debate on how to accomplish the stabilization of Greek 
debt and of the Greek state, was going to be characterized by grave controversy 
among EMU members and EU institutions.  
    Germany in particular displayed great reluctance and hesitation with respect to 
quick moves, that were likely to undermine the original framework of EMU, and the 
"no-bail-out" clause of the Treaty of Maastricht, which Germany had insisted upon 
back in the day. An article in the New York Times from February 15, 2010, 
documents the disapproval of the German public with two thirds of the population 
voting against a Greek bail out in polls. Slightly above half of German citizens would 
further have prefered Greece to be expelled "from the euro group entirely, if its 
mountain of debt threatened the stability of the currency union"21. Opposition formed 
way beyond public opinion: National economic and financial elites, which represent 
the traditional clientel and power base of the Christian Democratic Union, and Angela 
Merkel’s administration, became increasingly vocal about the unacceptibility of such 
severe violation of EMU law. Up to date the issue of the Euro crisis causes major 
friction among economic and political leaders in Germany. It led not only to a most 
controversial publication by Hans-Olaf Henkel, a former president of the Association 
of German Industry (one of the most powerful lobbying groups in the country), 
suggesting Germany to quit EMU, but also to the abandonment of Axel Weber’s 
(head of the German federal bank) most promising candidacy for presidency of the 
CEB.  
    German negotiators adapted the idea of an ordered process of insolvency for 
Greece as a possible option on the bargaining table in Brussels. According to an 
                                                
21 Nicholas Kulish, „Opposition Grows in Germany to Bailout for Greece“, New York 
Times, February 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/world/europe/16germany.html 
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article in the German magazine the "SPIEGEL" from March 26, 2010, the German 
chancellor Angela Merkel had initially tried to entirely keep the Greece issue off the 
agenda of the scheduled EU summit on March 26, 2010.22 When the unavoidability of 
adressing the topic became apparent, due to quickly dropping exchange rates during 
that same week, she laid out three conditions for an agreement on any European aid 
plan.  First, the German administration demanded a precise defintion of "last resort", 
secondly the involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the project, 
and third the tightening of the SGP. While successfully defending conditions one and 
two, against opposition, especially with regards to IMF involvement, from EU 
agencies as much as from what the German press came to call the "Club Med" 
fraction - a coalition of the Euro member states of France, Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Portugal - she failed in obtaining legal agreements on tightening SGP. It was agreed, 
that unanimity among the 17 Euro zone states would be required for any money to 
flow in the case of an emergency making specific loans necessary. German concerns 
about the lack of coercive mechanisms within the EU in order to grant for Greece’s 
austerity, which after all were supported by opposing  members’ rejection of the legal 
"deepening" of the SGP, are likely to have primarily caused Germany to adopt the 
position of the IMF to enter the picture. IMF programmes on the one hand provide for 
effective compliance control and on the other incorporate tools for the involvement of 
the private sector in granting the sustainability of an aid receiving state’s debt.23On 
April 11, 2010 the Council agreed to provide loans of up to 30 billion Euro to Greece 
                                                
22 Carsten Volkery, Auswaerts Glaenzen, Daheim Zaudern, www.spiegel.de, 
03/26/2010, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,685898,00.html 
23 Carsten Volkery, „Merkel’s Risky Hand of Brussels Poker“, Der Spiegel, March 
26, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,685771,00.html 
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at an interest rate of close to 5 % in order to prevent Greek insolvency as a payment 
deadline was approaching on May 9, 2010.24 
    However, when it became apparent 10 days later in a public statement of the 
European Union’s official statistics agency (eurostat) that Greek numbers on the 2009 
budget had not been accurate, and that the actual deficit had been at 13.6% rather than 
12.7% of GDP, rating agencies again cut ratings for Greek state bonds. The news 
represented a shock to markets, and within three days, ratings for Spain and Portugal 
were also lowered. In an emergency meeting on May 9th, 2010 the ministers of 
finance of the 27 members of the EU agreed in Brussels on a historic bail-out package 
for indebted member states, creating the European Financial Stability Facility. "EFSF 
is a Luxembourg-registered company owned by Euro Area Member States. It is 
headed by Klaus Regling, former Director-General for economic and financial affairs 
at the European Commission"25. The EFSF administers two thirds of the rescue 
package designed for the bail-out of member states for the sake of the stability of the 
common currency as a whole. It was designed as a temporary tool, and was supposed 
to stop activity in 2013. 
    The over all aid system has four structural components: Up to 60 billion Euros are 
provided by European Commission loans based on the mechanisms established to 
solve non-Eurozone, EU members’ balance-of-payment problems. In addition, if 
needed, Eurozone members grant for a volume of 440 billion Euros in total on the 
grounds of bilateral guarantees. Further, modelled after the plan for the Greek bail out 
the IMF contributed 250 billion Euros, which sums up to a total of 750 billion Euros. 
                                                
24 Wall Street Journal Online, „Europe’s Debt Crisis“ (Interactive Timeline), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704448304575195863350731920.ht
ml 
25 European Financial Stability Facility, „About EFSF“, 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.html 
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    A bilateral meeting between the heads of the member states of France and Germany 
in Deauville, had preceded the EU summit in Brussels on December 17, 2010. The 
relationship of the two countries, and their leaders Angela Merkel and Nicholas 
Sarlozy, had suffered from great controversy over the events of the year. Many of the 
intergovernmental processes had been characterized by the opposing positions of two 
coalitions of Eurogroup member states. One was led by France, Italy and Spain, and 
the other by Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. The bilateral meeting in France 
represented a reconciliation of the decisive axis Paris-Berlin, and although this 
exclusive negotiation caused discontent to other member states, the Franco-German 
agreement was finally supported in Brussels. 
    It was agreed, that a "permanent stabilization mechanism" was necessary to 
strengthen the Union and the common currency. It was decided to continue to pool 
funds among the 16 Eurogroup members, to assist stressed member states beyond the 
inital deadline in 2013, and to create the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
While the details of the structural design of ESM were postponed to the spring 
summit in March 2011, the cornerstones were outlined, based on the Franco-German 
deal: 
    "Last Resort" was defined as a case of danger to the stability of the entire Euro 
zone, and unanimity in the Council was required in order to activate the fund. Further, 
loans would be subject to strict conditionality and the IMF would continue to be 
involved on the basis of earlier negotiations. Most importantly, so-called "Collective 
Action Clauses" (CACs) were introduced, which involve the private sector in the 
assurance of the sustainability of a member states’ debt. More precisely, investors 
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would have to agree to a haircut, similar to an ordered procedure of insolvency 
modelled after the mechanisms of the IMF, and debt restructuring. 26 
    Revision of the Treaty of Lisbon would be necessary in order to create the 
permanent European Stability Mechanism, however it became clear, that a further 
delegation of sovereignty may require referenda in certain member states, and the 
negative experience with (for example) Ireland’s ratification of the treaty led 
members to design ESM on an intergovernmental basis, which would still require 
ratification of national parliaments, but no referenda. 
    Further, German chancellor Angela Merkel in her press conference on December 
17, 2010 in Brussels said, that "during the debate over the macroeconomic situation, 
we saw on the one hand, that improved culture of stability is needed, yet on the other 
support for growth potential as well"27. This statement suggests, that a further 
integration of inner European economic policy is ahead. On the one hand economic 
aid funds will be transferred across national borders, and a harmonization of 
economic capability within the EU will be adressed. On the other hand a further 
harmonization of fiscal policy is desired. 
    Already in September 2010 the European Commission had put forward a package 
of "legislative proposals" concerning ‚EU economic governance". The President of 
the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso stated: "For the first time we address 
decisively the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact; for the first time we 
                                                
26 Euroactiv, „Merkel, Sarkozy agree on EU treaty change to handle 
crises“,http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/merkel-sarkozy-agree-eu-treaty-change-
handle-crises-news-498902 
27 Angela Merkel, EU Council press conference, December 17, 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kSmy5foFbTA 
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propose that sanctions must be implemented much earlier in the process; for the first 
time we propose a structured system to deal with macroeconomic imbalances".28 
    This plan would have given new power to the Commission such as direct influence 
on member states’ taxation and fiscal spending policies through "early sanction 
mechanisms" applied by the Commission without approval of the Council, which 
would only have a say through the so-called "reverse voting mechanism". 
    However the outcome of the EU summit on March 24 and 25, 2011, did not quite 
match the vision of the Commission, although all aspects suggested by the proposal 
were discussed. 
Institutional outcome 
    An institutional deepening of the SGP under supranational authority of the 
Commission was not achieved. While the automatism of the Commission’s sanction 
mechanisms was enhanced, the "reverse majority rule" stands for the Council’s 
continous authority. Furthermore a system of intergovernmental "political peer 
pressure" was designed in order to adress the harmonization of inner-European 
economic and fiscal policy.  
    This "Pact for the Euro" includes the 17 members of the Euro group plus Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The conclusive document of the 
March 2011 Council holds, that the "Pact focusses primarily on areas that fall under 
national competence and are key for increasing competitiveness and avoiding harmful 
imbalances"29. The United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary and the Czech Republic are 
not part of this agreement. An annual review of best national practices shall lead to 
concrete measure taken by member states to enhance competitiveness, the 
                                                
28 Jose Manuel Barroso, Joint press conference with Commissioner Olli Rehn, 
Brussels, September 29, 2010, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/494 
29 EUCO, Conclusions, Brussels, Council of the European Union, March 25, 2011 
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sustainability of public finances and the stability of the financial sector. These 
commitments would then be implemented and supervised by the Commission. This 
method is going to be applied to all of the four areas, eventually including additional 
supranational bodies, such as the European Systemic Risk Board (a European institute 
for bank control) or the CEB. 
The ESM was structured as follows: 
    It is managed by a Board of Governors, consisting of the EMU member states. The 
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, and the President of the 
CEB will attend meetings as observers. In addition there will be a Board of Directors, 
and the agreement holds, that "voting weights within the Board of Governors and the 
Board of Directors will be proportional to the Member States’ respective 
subscriptions to the capital of the ESM. A qualified majority is defined as 80 percent 
of the votes.”20 Further, the ESM will start to operate in 2013, when the EFSF 
mandate expires, and will have 700 billion Euro in funds, 200 billion Euro in addition 
to the EFSF’s 500 billion. The CEB determines the contribution of each member to 
the fund according to shares in CEB’s capital, population size and GDP. 
    I conclude this chapter, the "Chronology of events and institutional outcomes" with 
a brief description of the rather complex decision making procedure of the 
ESM:When assistance is demanded by a Euro zone member state, the Eurogroup 
informs the Council and requests the Commission and the CEB to assess the question 
of "last resort" and the sustainability of the member states’ debt. The Commission 
will then, together with the CEB and the IMF negotiate the conditionality of an aid 
programme, which is then to be approved by the Council and then the Board of 
Governors. Commission, CEB and IMF will then supervise compliance and report to 
the Council and to the Board of Directors. Commission and Council will further 
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inform the European Parliament on ESM’s operations. ESM decision-making 
procedures involve on the one hand intergovernmental settings within the Euro group 
as much as within the broader EU framework, and on the other the supranational 
bodies of the Commission, the CEB and the European Parliament. In addition non 
Euro-group as much as non-EU states are permitted to get involved if desired, and the 
IMF continues to participate in the design and implementation of austerity programs 
for receiving states. The intergovernmental body of the Council has the authority to 
initiate the process, and to approve specific programmes. The key decision-making 
bodies of the ESM are intergovernmental, and supranational bodies rather play an 
administrative role. 
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                                                   CHAPTER 3 
    Chapter 3 provides for an analysis of data on the political process that led to the 
institutional outcome of the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" by an 
agreement of the Council of the European Union on March 25, 2011 in Brussels. As 
oulined in the Research Design, according to central pillars of the contrasting theories 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, I will seek to find evidence on 
supranational agency as determining factor in the process and the institutional 
outcome. Secondly I will investigate member states’ interest and the significance of 
intergovernmental bargaining in the process and as reflected by the institutional 
outcome. The opposing positions of the member states of France and Germany, which 
had characterized the process will be of particular interest in this context. A brief 
discussion of the concept of national preferences in this context will be added. 
    Then I will investigate the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" as an 
incremental, endogenous process, as neofunctionalism would suggest on the one 
hand, and on the other analyse the impact of external events on the process, as liberal 
intergovernmentalism holds. 
Supranational Agency 
    Besides ensuring the stability of the Euro, leveling out macroeconomic imbalances 
within the Euro zone had ever since the introduction of the common currency in 1999 
been of central concern to the authority of the European Commission. Countries of 
such diverse levels of productivity sharing a common currency, as is the case among 
the member states of EMU, find themselves running into distributive problems. But 
since measures necessary to effectively impact states’ competitiveness, on the one 
hand involve policy areas sensible to the very core of state sovereignty, such as 
taxation and details of fiscal spending, and on the other would require massive 
 34 
redistribution of capital within the Union, the Commission had hardly been able to 
circumvent member states’ opposition.  
    The debate over the Euro crisis, wich ultimately resulted in the creation of ESM, 
displayed the fact, that heads of state came to agree with supranational agents on the 
necessity of a further integration of economic policies with all its implications for 
national politics in order to preserve not only the common currency, but also the over 
all project of the Union. The debate on this issue among supranational agents and 
member states perpetuated a pattern of the economically more potent states’ (the 
North) supporting the Commission’s call for an extension of supranational authority 
with respect to member states’ internal fiscal policy, while opposing an extension of 
supranational authority to increase and direct community funds. On the other hand, 
the economically less potent states, and potential receivers of aid tended to support 
more supranational authority with respect to funds, while opposing extension of 
supranational authority with respect to national fiscal policy. 
    The position of the commission was made clear by Joaquin Almunia: "In the euro 
area…default does not exist"30. 
    As mentioned, in September 2010 the Commission, building on concepts 
previously developed in the context of the ‚deepenening" of the SGP, had put forward 
a first concrete proposal for the creation of a revised and complementary institutional 
framework which was supposed to establish a permanent mechanism that would 
realize monetary stability and a harmonization of economic capability.This proposal 
gave the Commission the authority to formulate common economic policies, and to 
trigger the stability mechanism, which consists on the one hand of the implementation 
                                                
30 Reuters, „DAVOS-EU's Almunia: no chance Greece default, euro zone exit“, 
January 9, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/29/davos-almunia-
idUSLAE00004520100129 
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of early sanctions in order to ensure member states’ compliance to the convergence 
criteria, and on the other the direction of pooled member states’ funds. Besides the 
mentioned conflict between France and Germany on quick moves bailing out Greece, 
and further delegation of sovereignty, the conflict between the German administration 
and the Commission had also been a central feature of the process leading to the 
creation of ESM.31 According to an article in the German newspaper the 
"Handelsblatt", German chancellor Angela Merkel, and President of the European 
Commission Jose Manuel Baroso (who was elected in 2004 especially thanks to the 
support of Angela Merkel leading the German opposition at the time), who during the 
greatly complicated negotiations over the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 had still worked 
together, fought a "power struggle" against each other during the entire episode from 
Greece to Brussels.  
    Once it was agreed, that the Euro zone should be preserved as it is, actors fought 
over the precise institutional design of a permanent mechanism. The question of 
sovereignty was central to the controversy among the supranational agents in the 
Commission and German state representatives. 
    Naturally supranational agents, and the European Commission as the principal 
"executive body" of the European Union, understood the arising problems, namely the 
potential unsustainability of fiscal debt in particluar EMU member states, as a call to 
after all entrust the European Union as supranational institution with the solution for 
the sake of the common welfare. Increasingly assertive self-determination of 
supranational organs represent a theoretic automatism imbedded in the 
neofunctionalist framework, and it is fair to say, that the Commission during the crisis 
                                                
31 www.handelsblatt.de, Merkel und Barroso wollen Euro-Streit schlichten, January 
23, 2011, http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/merkel-und-barroso-
wollen-euro-streit-schlichten/3771306.html 
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fought to embody the supranational approach to European integration by claiming 
more executive power. 
    Further, in early 2011 the conflict between the Commission and the German 
government continued, when the Commission called for an additional strengthening 
of the fund, that should be provided to the ESM. The Commission was ultimately 
successful with the initiative to raise the pool to 80 billion in paid-in capital and 620 
billion Euro in guarantees despite German reluctance to agree. Obviously, there is 
evidence on a decisive impact of supranational agency on the integrative process, but 
not so much on the precise institutional outcome. The central objectives of ESM and 
the "Pact for the Euro" are consistent with the Commission’s definition of necessity to 
deepen EMU. Yet, as mentioned, the authority of the Commission with respect to 
automatic early sanctioning mechanisms in order to ensure member states’ 
compliance with the SGP was enhanced, but not entirely delegated by the Council, 
which preserves the right to annul the Commission’s policies through the reverse 
majority rule. The task to realize macroeconomic balance within the EU was not 
assigned to the supranational body of the Commission but to an intergovernmental 
setting, which operates via political pressure, rather than binding rule. 
    The "Pact for The Euro" provides for an extension of the EU’s institutional 
influence on member states’ fiscal policy, and ESM for an extension of inter-state 
redistribution of capital as much as tightened SGP compliance mechanisms. Although 
the Commission’s early position, that Greece should be supported by the other EMU 
members, clashed heavily with the intitial position of the decisive member state of 
Germany, there has not only been a provision of member states’ funds to Greece, but 
also a process has been initiated, that may lead to a further de facto integration of 
European economic and fiscal policy, and a harmonization of economic capability 
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within the European Union. The fact of the matter is, that despite great controversy 
among member states and the Commission, the outcome respresents a step in 
integration, which embraces the involvement of supranational bodies in the 
conception and implementation of programmes to consolidate indebted member 
states’ national budget deficits.  
    Yet, the institutional role the Commission will play in the new mechanism is rather 
of an administrative, than an executive nature. The institutional design of the ESM, as 
agreed on by member states during the EU summit in Brussels on March 24 and 25, 
2011, clearly entrusts intergovernmental bodies with the ultimate decision-making 
authority. The initiative triggering the mechanism comes from the Euro group 
members, and while the Commission is entrusted with "assessments" of the 
dimension of stressed member states’ problems, the intergovernmental bodies, such as 
the Council, the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors have to approve 
decisions made by the Commission. The Commission further shares the task to tailor 
detailed programmes for ESM supported states with the CEB and the IMF, and is 
again required to have proposals approved in the intergovernmental settings. 
    The intergovernmental "peer pressure" method, that has been created to tackle the 
harmonization of EMU members’ economic and fiscal policies in order to prevent 
future crises, will still have to prove efficiency, but at the time being supranational 
agents have no decision-making authority in this process, and only get involved, when 
the ESM has been initiated by EMU members. 
Intergovernmental Bargaining 
    The political, inter-state process, intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of 
national preferences, which after all serve to define national interest, clearly 
determined the design of the ESM and of the "Pact for the Euro". Sovereignty of 
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member states is factually only delegated as a consequence of QMV in 
intergovernmental procedures eliminating single members’ right to veto, once a case 
of "last resort" is agreed upon.  
    While specific economic interests were divergent, rather than"convergent", states’ 
common interest in the preservation of the Euro in its present form made an 
agreement on further institutional integration after all possible. 
    All actors involved eventually came to link the future of EMU to the future of the 
European Union itself, and an abandonment of this project was apparently as 
unacceptable to the opposing member state of Germany as it had been to the 
European Commission and virtually also to the French government. 
    The following two scenarios were imaginable as an alternative to the preservation 
of the Euro as it is. First, there is the withdrawal of insolvent member states from 
EMU, a haircut at the cost of private investors, and a devaluation of a new national 
currency in order to regain competitiveness. The second option, that has been drawn 
up by European economists such as Michel Gedot or Axel Weber, and which 
continues to impact the debate on European economic integration, is to split the Euro 
zone in half and create a "South Euro" and a "North Euro". Most enthusiastic 
proponents of this vision, such as Hans Olaf Henkel32, a former President of the 
Association of German Industry and former supporter of the Euro, could even 
imagine a model, that would not integrate France and Germany. Although the bulk of 
economic analysts continues to question the sustainability of the Euro, and although 
weak member states’ need for room to devaluate continues to be heralded in the 
business world, political actors refuse to adopt such a course of action at the time 
being.  
                                                
32 Hans Olaf Henkel, „Rettet unser Geld“, Muenchen: Heyne 2010 
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    When the systemic relevance of Greece’s possible default became apparent by the 
cut in ratings of Spain’s, and Portugal’s credibility as a consequence to the adjusted 
numbers on the Greek budget deficit in early 2010, the consensus on the common 
interest among member states, that EMU should be preserved, served as the guide to 
the final agreement made in March 2011. 
    While France had early taken position alongside the European Commission in favor 
of supporting Greece, and of preserving the Euro zone as a whole, Germany had 
intially considered the option of convincing Greece to quit EMU. 
    Apparently, in the early stages of this crisis, which would soon expand to the 
member states of Spain, Ireland and Portugal, the German administration did not 
identify the systemic relevance of Greece’s anticipated bankruptcy. And as soon as it 
came apparent, that actors were potentially deciding on the future of the very Union, a 
common position was found rather quickly. 
    The remarkable thing about this particular process is that the dividing line led up 
the Rhine river. It is certainly not a novelty to the history of European integration that 
France and Germany would start negotiating on the grounds of opposing positions, 
but both countries represent the largest contributors to ESM funds providing for more 
than 47 per cent of the paid-in capital of 80 billion, and of the 420 billion in 
guarantees. 
The German Position 
    The German position stands for a member state, that is unwilling to cease 
sovereignty, because it first and foremost has to serve the interest of the national 
electorate. While the German government is consistent in its political will to preserve 
EMU over all, it is conscious of the fact, that most of the funds being redistributed 
come from the national tax revenue. Germany therefore claims direct political impact 
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on the decisions made by, and the programmes undertaken by the European 
Commission. While this potent member state’s general commitment to the pooling of 
sovereignty is apparent, there is little evidence of a willingness to delegate 
sovereignty to supranational bodies. German European leaders are obviously state-
centric enough to maximize Germany’s independent power and influence on 
European international processes. 
    For Germany to eventually support the position of the Commission and the French 
government, and to acknowledge the necessity of inner European redistribution of 
capital as one condition for the preservation of EMU, the threat of a fundamental cut 
in the relationship with France must have represented the key issue of systemic 
relevance. 
    Across the German political spectrum officials of all ranks, and parliamentarians of 
virtually all parties, against audible, critical voices of all kinds of intra-state groups, 
publicly stated, that Germany had benefitted greatly from the Euro, and linked the fate 
of EMU to the fate of the Union itself. Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed the 
creation of ESM to be "without alternative"33. Two-thirds of German exports, which 
in total make up 47% of GDP, go to EMU member states - markets that were likely to 
get lost if states were devaluating. But, most importantly, German geopolitical weight 
had been linked to European integration ever since the Treaty of Rome in 1952, and 
the prevention of renewed inner-Continental European competition among states, and 
concerns with enhanced political division as a consequence of economic inequality, 
had defined raison d’etat of European states and of Germany in particular, since 1945. 
For Germany the entire historical process of European integration had been "without 
                                                
33 Angela Merkel, Government note, May, 19, 2010, Deutscher Bundestag, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iehWNPPKaks 
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alternative", and especially with respect to the Treaty of Maastricht representing 
European neigbors’ condition for an agreement to German unification.  
    According to the Spanish daily newspaper El Pais, Nicholas Sarkozy during a 
heated discussion with Angela Merkel in Brussels  on May 9th, threatened to 
withdraw France from EMU, if Germany would not support inner European financial 
aid34. 
    At a decision point like that, bearing political implications of such magnitude the 
decision to give in to the arguments of supranational agents and French officials, 
represented the most rational response, even if the French president’s harsh position  
was more an act of Hungarian temperament rather than solid negotiation. In any case, 
it worked. 
    However German negotiators upheld national interest by ensuring direct impact on 
the activities of the new mechanism thereby calling for a continuation of the basic 
conflict in the future, when the new procedure is tested. The German government has 
controlled the initiation of a process, which will harmonize fiscal policy within 
Europe according to best practices in an intergovernmental setting. Being the 
economically most capable European member state, the "peer pressure" method, 
which profits from the essentiality of the over all conflict at hand, namely the end of 
EMU and potentially the EU, will enhance especially Germany’s influence on other 
member states’ fiscal policy. Wolfgang Schaeuble, the German minister of finance 
said, that as any crisis also the Euro crisis "bears an opportunity"35, and although 
European integration appears to be taking an initially undesired leap, the German 
                                                
34 Giles Tremlett,  Richard Wray and  Nick Fletcher, „ 
Fears over Greek bailout send shares and euro tumbling“, The Guardian, May 15, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/14/nicolas-sarkozy-threatened-
euro-withdrawal 
35 Frank Bethmann, Christian Kirsch and Thomas Walde, Ich, der Euro, eine 
Waehrung in der Krise, 3sat Documentary, May 28, 2010 
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government seeks to control the future of this process, which per se is interpreted as 
being unavoidable and ultimately in German interest. 
The French Position 
    France’s interest in preserving the Euro as it is, is just as vital as Germany’s interest 
in doing so. France’s engagement in European integration, besides shared concerns 
about a perpetuation of inner-Continental European conflict after 1945, had 
historically been characterized by a desire to check potential German independent 
power.36 The Deutsche Mark, in particluar was viewed as a "dictate"37 (Theo Waigel) 
during the 80s, and the common currency represented a means to keep German 
economic and social policy linked to French economic and social policy.  
    Further, "In the case of France and Germany, one plus one is three", this statement 
by Nicholas Sarkozy during a Franco-German summit in Paris in 2008, gives a hint 
with respect to both nations’ "functional interdependence" as much as "convergent 
interest" – both seek to maximize geopolitical weight. 
    However, the intitial controversy among France and Germany points to the fact, 
that France’s decision to push alongside the Commission for a Greek bail out despite 
the likelihood of a lack of popularity among national voters, had been motivated by 
immediately pressing national interests. 
    France is the only European country that comprises within her national territory the 
vast economic imbalances, which set Southern European members apart from 
Northern European members. French investment in Greece is the most substantial 
                                                
36 Micheal J. Baun, The Masstricht Treaty as High Politics, France, and European 
Integration, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, no 4, The Academy of Political 
Science, 1995 
37 Frank Bethmann, Christian Kirsch and Thomas Walde, Ich, der Euro, eine 
Waehrung in der Krise, 3sat Documentary, May 28, 2010 
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compared to other European states, and her involvement in the Mediterranean region 
in general is crucial to French state power. Exposure of French banks to Greece is 
nearly 79 billion Euro (German banks have 43 billion Euro exposure to Greece)38, and 
according to Dirk Hoffmann-Becking of Sanford C. Bernstein as quoted by the Wall 
Street Journal "French banks would be dealt a ‚severe’ blow by a default on Greece’s 
debt"39, which potentially would have represented an existential threat to major 
institutes such as BNP Paribas or Societe General. The potential gravity of the 
consequences of a Greek default to the state of France possibly led French officials to 
identify the systemic relevance of Greece’s debt crisis before the Germans did. 
National Preferences 
    A repetitive theme of the press coverage on the issue is a perception of a rather new 
German assertion and confidence. After the seminal events during 2008, which after 
all served to fundamentally change the global economy, elites grew increasingly 
confident of the German system, the social market economy, which relies on liberal 
market rules, and yet provides for strong state regulation and a state-run cushion of 
social welfare. Further, the German historic trauma with inflation has determined the 
country’s strict culture of economic stability, which had been the basis of the SGP. 
The consolidation of the fiscal budget, putting a stop to fiscal debt had been on the 
German agenda since 2005, and was amended to the basic law in 2009.Germany has 
great savings rates, and an enormous trade balance surplus. The myth of the "Swabian 
housewive", who saves and only spends money that she has got in her pocket was 
                                                
38 Jill Treanor, France and Switzerland most exposed to Greece's debt crisis, say 
analysts, www.guardian.co.uk, February 11, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/11/greece-debt-france-switzerland 
39 William Launder, Jethro Mullen, „German, French Banks Vulnerable“, Wall Street 
Journal Online, April 29, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704423504575212323413641634.ht
ml 
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promoted by officials across the aisle.40The experience with politically intricate, strict 
budget reduction policies during the former years on the one hand, and Germany’s 
relative success in handling the crisis by promoting national joint efforts among 
employers, workers and government agencies using measures such as "Kurzarbeit" on 
the other, led to a decrease in political will to tolerate the inner European differences 
in fiscal spending policy, especially of virtually less competitive member states. The 
lessons learned from the financial crisis with respect to deregulation and fiscal budget 
deficits seemed to support the German position, and the reduction of fiscal deficit as 
much as the enhanced regulation of the banking sector in particular are now on the 
agenda of virtually all developed countries. 
    Differences in fiscal and economic culture serve to determine national preferences. 
There is evidence that these differences were also at the core of the Franco-German 
conflict over the future of EMU, and the scope of ESM. 
    Michel Godet, an economic advisor to the French government, who basically 
shared the initial German position, "that some countries should leave the Euro zone", 
and who could even envision "two Euro zones", held that "France has the same 
Mediterranean mindset as Greece and, like Greece, finances its growth through deficit 
spending".41 
    The following episode on France’s proposition to deepen economic integration 
within the EU, during her presidency of the Council in the second half of 2008, will 
serve to further highlight the contrasting national preferences among France and 
Germany with respect to economic and fiscal policy. 
                                                
40 Kathrin Bennhold, „In Greek Debt Crisis, a Window to the German Psyche“, The 
New York Times, May 4, 2010, New York edition 
41 Eleanor Beardsley, „Germans Resent Plans To Bail Out Greece“, NPR morning 
edition, April 29, 2010 
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    France had called for a common "European economic government" already in 
2008. Nicholas Sarkozy said to the European parliament on October 21, 2008, that 
"Europe has a common currency and a central bank, but no common policy", and that 
"Europe cannot continue without an economic government"42. About a month after 
the break down of Lehman Brothers in New York the French president called in 
Brussels for coordinated action of national state funds to buy up weakened European 
key industrial enterprises in anticipation of non-EU investors’ potential take overs.  
Pointing to state funds in Asia and the Middle East, Sarkozy, said: "I do not want 
European citizens to wake up in a couple of month to the fact, that European 
companies are owned by non-European capitals."43 
    However this call for more integration in 2008 was not heard by the German 
administration. German divergent economic interest became apparent in the 
statements of Germany’s minister of economy at the time, Michael Glos, who said 
that "the French proposition to safe-guard European industries against foreign take 
over with state money, contradicts all the successful principles of our economic 
policy".44 
    Making this proposition, Sarkozy had particularly the European auto industry in 
mind and was demanding a European solution, while Germany preferred to bolster the 
auto industry through national programmes such as the German version of "cash for 
clunkers". 
                                                
42 Thomas Gack, Corinna Visser, „Wir brauchen eine Wirtschaftsregierung“, Der 
Tagesspiegel Online, October 21, 2008, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/wir-
brauchen-eine-wirtschaftsregierung/1353134.html 
 
43 Thomas Gack, Corinna Visser 
44 Thomas Gack, Corinna Visser 
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    Apparently, for the German administration to understand and ultimately support a 
further integration of European economies, it took the existentiality of the threat of 
the Euro crisis expressed by a potential, fundamental break with France.  
    The "Pact for the Euro" after all represents a first real step towards a potentially 
truly integrated economic and fiscal policy in Europe, and Germany as the most 
competitive economy within the EU, and greatest potential contributor to CEB and 
ESM funding seeks to control the process. 
    The intergovernmental design of the "Pact for the Euro" and the "peer pressure" 
method is likely to provide for a continuation of inner-European conflict, especially 
among its key members France and Germany, since the integration of European 
economies still has to be realized, and a common economic and fiscal policy still has 
to be formulated in detail. 
Incremental Endogenous Process 
The steps leading to the creation of ESM, at first site, can certainly not be described 
as incremental, as neofunctionalism would suggest. Strategies to enhance the stability 
of the common currency, EU competitiveness, and to harmonize economic capability 
within EMU, as mentioned, have been on the agenda for over 10 years, however this 
particular and first meaningful step to accomplish that goal was made rather bluntly, 
and spontaneously.  
    Yet, the creation of the "Pact for the Euro" actually represents the beginning of an 
institutional process, which is supposed to eventually lead to an integrated economic 
and fiscal policy within the EU, and which therefore could be described as probably 
being of an incremental nature. But since we have no other choice than looking at the 
present institutional outcome, and since the creation of EFSF, ESM and the related 
"Pact for the Euro" represent the deflection on the dependent variable that can be 
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observed, we have to acknowledge the relative haste in which these institutions were 
created and should postpone the question as to whether the de facto integration of 
European economic and fiscal policy may over all turn out to be indeed an 
incremental process. 
    Neofunctionalists, as pointed out, identify spillovers as a key automatism, that, 
once sparked by supranational agents causes states to continously delegate 
sovereignty in order to reduce transaction costs. Spillover is understood as a positive, 
organic process with a life of his own, somewhat independent from state interest per 
se, and capable of naturally and incrementally shifting authority from national 
governments to supranational institutions. 
   The institutional outcome of the process leading to the creation of the ESM can 
hardly be explained as the result of a spillover. This fact becomes especially evident 
with the acknowledgement of the notion, that transnational socio-economic synergies 
regarding this issue were virtually absent. While Euroscepticism of national 
electorates represents a constant feature of the process of European integration, and of 
EMU in particular, interests of relevant economic elites, which had originally 
promoted the common currency in opposition to mainstream public opinion across 
borders, changed position on EMU. Especially in Germany, the same economic elites, 
that intially were decisively involved in the transnational socio-economic activities 
leading to the creation of the Euro, came to change their minds, and began to promote 
solutions in favor of more national sovereignty. In addition, the heated debate on the 
issue makes it hard to identify an organic automatism, and the very limited delegation 
of sovereignty in the institutional outcome, which does not include de facto delegation 
of sovereignty to supranational bodies, underscores this point. 
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    The more complicated and yet potentially more enlightening question with respect 
to the predictive value of neofunctionalism is the following: To what extent does the 
process leading to the creation of ESM, and this further step in the deepening of 
European economic integration, represent an endogenous process? 
    It is observable, that during the year 2010 endogenous sytemic problems were 
brought to light. Bank bail-outs, and recovery plans had caused virtually all member 
states to increase national debt, and those overindebted in the first place were crushed 
by the bursting bubble. 
    As mentioned, states of vastly differing productivity that share a common currency 
encounter distributive problems. Re-distribution of capital across national borders is a 
given necessity in such a monetary union, and by itself a most complicated matter for 
national politicians. Secondly, less productive European states had little incentive to 
implement politically costly, but efficient fiscal policy, since they were after all 
profitting from the strength of more competitive member states.  
    It is indeed a structural problem of EMU’s design, that states of differing economic 
capability share a common currency without any mechanism in place to provide for 
an equivalent integration of core features of economic and fiscal policy. Due to the 
continous fragmentalisation of the political system, which is determined by sovereign 
member states’ internal political processes, policies necessary to level out economic 
imbalances for the sake of monetary stability of  EMU as a whole are most difficult to 
implement. 
    I repeat my point, that the step to create a mechanism that would allow for the re-
distribution of capital within EMU on the one hand, and on the other the 
harmonization of European economic and fiscal policy maximizing member states’ 
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competitiveness, bears a certain endogenous logic, and to a great degree is a 
consequence of institutional insufficiencies immanent to the European system. 
    Greece’s structural problems, and unsatisfactory economic performance had been 
of great significance in the debates accompanying Greece’s entry into EMU in 2001. 
Greece was viewed as a potential risk to the stability of the Euro zone from the outset, 
however political considerations led member states’ to agree unanimously on the 
acceptance of Greece. The inaccuracy of Greece’s numbers had been suspected all 
along, and her fiscal spending outgrowing productivity could have been predicted. 
    Therefore, one could support the neofunctionalist perception of integration 
representing mostly an endogenous process, and note, that the creation of ESM had 
been anticipated by the incompleteness of the monetary union.  
    The evidence on the creation of ESM supports this analysis: As soon as the Greek 
crisis had become a European crisis, all state governments, and France and Germany 
as the most potent ones in particular, did exclude the abandonment of the Euro in its 
present form. They rather sought (even painful) compromise in order to preserve the 
current state of affairs and to push the process forward towards greater 
integration.Undoubtedly the Euro crisis and the creation of the new institution of the 
ESM have greatly been determined by endogenous systemic features. 
External Shocks And Events 
Liberal intergovernmentalist thought criticizes neofunctionalists’ lack of sensitivity 
with respect to external factors pushing integration. 
    The steps taken in 2010, and ultimately the decision made in March 2011 to install 
a permanent, comprehensive mechanism to harmonize inner-European economic 
capability, would not have taken place without exogenous factors, or better external 
shocks and events demanding reactive decision. 
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    The rhetoric of supranational agents as much as heads of state does indeed imply a 
reaction to exogenous factors: 
    The new Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn has 
celebrated the creation of ESM, by saying that Europe is doing "whatever it takes to 
defend the Euro"45, and French president Nicholas Sarkozy held, that Europe was not 
going to "let undo others what generations have created"31. The head of BAFIN, 
Jochen Sanio had said, that there was a "war of aggression against the Euro 
zone"46presumably orchestrated by speculators in banks, hedge and pension funds 
around the world. Without getting into this conspiracy theory, I can provide 
supportive evidence for external events being key to the initiation of this new step in 
European integration: As mentioned, the creation of a permanent stability mechanism 
was not discussed before the systemic necessity became clear in the revised rating of 
Spain and Portugal by the major rating agencies in New York and London.  
    However, as outlined above, the French government’s call for the deepening of 
European economic and fiscal integration, for a European "economic government" in 
2008, had also represented a reaction to the consequences of the global economic and 
financial crisis, and was motivated by concerns about non-EU countries gaining 
control of weakened EU key industries. This French initiative failed due to especially 
German opposition. The German government obviously did not identify the necessity 
to integrate further as a reaction to the developments in the global economy after 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, and preferred to provide national solutions. 
                                                
45 Micheal Schuman, Whatever It Takes to Save The Euro, www.time.com, May 24, 
2010, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1989056,00.html 
46 Reuters, Speculators are waging a fierce war against the Euro zone, 
www.reuters.com, May 5, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/05/germany-
bafin-idUSLDE64416020100505 
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    This implies, that Germany did not see any reason to doubt the functionality of the 
present institutional framework of the EU as a reaction to international economic 
strife in 2008. That observation leads me to argue, that the suggested activity of 
external actors, of speculators betting against the Euro, shed light on existentially 
problematic issues immanent to the European system, and that this time exogenous 
factors may have facilitated the initiation of a probably incremental, endogenous 
process, which was essentially unavoidable within the logic of European integration. 
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                                                          CHAPTER 4 
                                                           Conclusion 
    Introducing the conclusive chapter of my study, which aims to determine the 
predictive as much as the explanatory value of neofunctionalism and/or 
intergovernmentalism, of supranationalism and/or state-centrism as theoretic 
approaches to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro", I would have to note, 
that on the one hand there is process, and on the other institutional outcome. Data on 
both of these somewhat separated objects is needed to understand and explain 
European integration. Integration per se is a mobile phenomenon, and the institutional 
outcome represents the status of the process.  
    A theory’s explanatory value becomes especially evident in the context of the 
outcome, yet its predictive value appears rather with respect to the process. State 
integration as an outcome is indicated by the actual level of delegation or of  pooling 
of national sovereignty (or better sacrifice thereof) at a certain point in time. State 
integration as a process suggests a historical evaluation and classification of a 
particular outcome in order to then be able to speculate about the future process 
according to observed developments with respect to the delegation or pooling of 
sovereignty in the past.  
    Most reliable predictions about future process are possible, when the past process 
provides for linearity. The more non-linear the process the more complex and 
potentially uncertain the prediction.When a process prooves to be perfectly linear, 
prediction becomes explanation, since outcomes can be calculated precisely, rather 
than speculated upon. Explanatory theory therefore must provide for solidly linear 
logic in order to be valuable, and must deliver on the prediction of the precise 
outcome. 
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    Process is measured by the observation of trend, and the mere existence of a 
positive trend confirming expectations represents the ultimate supportive evidence on 
the dependent variable, in this case state integration.  
    State integration as a process is normative, state integration as an outcome is 
descriptive, and in my view a fundamental misunderstanding among Haas and 
Moravcsik appears to be, that Haas  is primarily refering to the normativity of the 
process, while Moravcsik is mainly concerned with the descriptiveness of the 
outcome. 
    European treaty work captures the descriptive as much as normative quality of 
European integration. Law in general, and international law in particular must provide 
for a harmonious balance among the two in order to be effective. Supranationalism 
embodies the normative element of the EU’s institutional framework, while state-
centrism represents the descriptive element.47 
    Moravcsik’s theory holds that integration as an outcome represents the result of an 
occasional sequence, that starts with an intitiative of states following their respective 
interests, and which results in a delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions 
as an affirmation of the credibility of commitments made after a process of 
intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of relative bargaining power. This precise 
linearity represents the explanatory mechanism of liberal intergovernmentalism. 
According to this model integration is the supranational outcome of an 
intergovernmental process. Supranational institutions serve as the measurement of 
integration, but are not part of the process, they rather represent the final outcome.  
                                                
47 Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl, International Law as Operating and Normative 
Systems: An Overview, eds Charlotte Kuhl and Paul F Diehl, International Law: 
Classic and Contemporary Readings, 3rd edition, London: Lynne Rienner, 2009 
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    I would like to introduce the test of liberal intergovernmentalism with this quite 
substantial, and central quote of Moravcsik’s original text:  
    "European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national 
leaders who consistently pursued economic interests – primarily commercial interests 
of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of 
ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural 
incentives in the global economy. When such interests converged integration 
advanced."48 
    Since liberal intergovernmentalism provides for such a precise linearity, and such a 
precise definition of outcome, its value in the context of the creation of ESM and the 
related "Pact for the Euro" should be tested according to the nature and origin of the 
initiative, the exclusive intergovernmentalism of the process, and delegation of 
sovereignty as the integrative outcome. 
    First, the initiative to pool member states’ funds and to bail out Greece in the first 
place had been taken by the European Commission at a point when Germany and 
France were still making up their minds about the issue. 
    The following political process leading to the creation of ESM shows, that interests 
among member states regarding this issue were divergent rather than convergent. The 
decision to after all engage in a comprehensive process aiming to establish a de facto 
EMU was not characterized by convergent, issue-specific national preferences, and 
was also not followed by a de facto delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies, 
but rather by a late, but apparently credible commitment of member states to pool and 
also delegate sovereignty in intergovernmental settings. 
                                                
48 Andrew Moravcsik, ed. Donald J. Puchala, Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism 
and European Integration: A Review Article, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 
37, no 2, June 1999, p. 326 
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    Furthermore, although external factors had a decisive impact on the recent 
developments within EMU and the EU, evidence does not support the notion, that 
national preferences were "developed as a consequence of exogenous changes in the 
nature of issue-specific functional interdependence." 
    The national preferences, which had characterized the process of intergovernmental 
bargaining, were not really a result of current exogenous changes. The political 
process leading to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" as much as the 
institutional outcome reflect a traditional debate among monetarists and economists, 
which has been affiliated with the creation of EMU ever since the early stages of the 
process in the late 60s. Both French officials and Commissioners traditionally 
represent the monetarist camp, while Germany in alliance with neighboring Northern 
European states traditionally embodies the economist position. Just like during the 
late 1980s the monetarist alliance, which combines supranational and partial member 
state interest, was successful in promoting the immediate pursuit of further monetary 
integration without previous macroeconomic balancing. Yet the opposed economist 
camp, which in the case of Europe is obviously exclusive to member state interest was 
comparatively successful in promoting the integration of European economic and 
fiscal policy. Back in 1996 the introduction of the common currency (1999) was 
coupled with a mechanism that was supposed to provide for the convergence of 
national economic and fiscal policy, namely the SGP. The harmonization of economic 
and fiscal policy within EMU as an institutionalized function parallel to the creation 
of a common currency represented the compromise between monetarists and 
economists back in the 90s, and in fact this parallelity represents the compromise 
today. While ESM provides for a redistribution of funds of an unprecedented 
dimension across national borders for the sake of monetary stability, SGP sanctioning 
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mechanisms have been made more automatic as a responsibility of the Commission to 
initiate measures early in the process, and in addition member states have made a 
commitment to realize the harmonization of European economic and fiscal policy on 
the basis of intergovernmental bargaining.  
    Liberal intergovernmentalism with respect to the creation of ESM, however 
captures correctly the fact, that institutional outcome reflects member states’ national 
preferences. The problem is that integration occurred despite the virtual absence of 
convergent economic interests, and although de facto delegation of sovereignty to 
supranational institutions is minor. The authority to initiate the ESM lies with member 
states. Even the only additional delegation of sovereignty to the Commission, namely 
the right to initiate binding early sanctions, is after all subject to the Council’s good 
will due to the "reverse majority mechanism".  
    The assertion of member states vis-a-vis the Commission is a phenomenon, that 
had characterized the post-Cold War process of deepening as much as widening and is 
reflected in the status of the institutional foundation of European integration, namely 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In the institutional outcome member states virtually sought to 
limit the  delegation, or better sacrifices of national sovereignty by strengthening 
intergovernmental, rather than supranational elements. QMV procedures provide for 
intergovernmental efficiency and supranational institutions have become the less 
attractive alternative in order to reach an integrated outcome. 
    The delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies has been minor, be it because 
supranational agents failed to sufficiently undermine national sovereignty, as 
neofunctionalism would assume, or because member states’ commitment lacks 
credibility, as liberal intergovernmentalism suggests. Yet, a deflection on the 
dependent variable is observable, since member states’ funds are continously being 
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pooled, and member states have accepted factual and potential additional sacrifices of 
national autonomy in crucial policy areas. 
    Germany’s reluctance to follow the Commission’s recommendations, and France’s 
all-out threat to quit EMU, first and foremost show, besides the divergence of national 
preferences, that functional interdependence was not issue-specific. The German 
decision to agree to the creation of ESM did not at all reflect the commercial interests 
of the German economic elite, which publicly promoted issue-specific functional 
independence suggesting alternative courses of action such as a division of the Euro 
zone. Yet, integration occurred and the institutional outcome reflects to a certain 
degree German as much as French macroeconomic preference. 
    I would like to argue, that the fact, that European states chose to continue to 
integrate rather than to disintegrate the monetary union was caused by general, 
geopolitical interdependence49, rather than issue-specific economic convergent 
interest. 
    While this notion supports state-centrism as being the main determinator of the 
process as much as the outcome, it however reveals the weakness of liberal 
intergovernmentalist explanatory capacity. The linear precision of Moravcsik’s model 
fails to capture the exact process as much as the precise institutional outcome. A 
theory, that fails to explain precise institutional outcome, may not necessarily fail to 
predict on process. Yet since Moravcsik emphasizes linear precision as the particular 
value of liberal intergovernmentalism and integration as an outcome rather than a 
process, one has to note, that with respect to explaining the creation of ESM and the 
"Pact for the Euro", the theory fails to live up to its promise, and leaves the student of 
European integration with a continous need for explanatory theory. 
                                                
49 Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Los Angeles, University 
of California Press, 1992 
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    Moravcsik notes with a certain cynicism, that every time European integration 
experiences a step in the process analysts hail neofunctionalism as being the superior 
theory despite explanatory insufficiencies. However, any piece of evidence, which 
supports the mere existence of a continous process of European integration despite 
controversy among member states, does indeed support the neofunctionalist 
assumptions of state integration being irreversible and some sort of an incremental 
automatic process beyond particular states’ national interest per se.  
    However neofunctionalist explanatory mechanisms, just like liberal 
intergovernmentalist explanatory mechanisms fail to precisely account for the 
creation of ESM. 
    Neofunctionalism understands state integration as being much less of a linear 
process, than liberal intergovernmentalism does, and further understands 
supranational institutions as being an essential part of the process not only the 
outcome. Transnational socio-economic synergies, which, guided by supranational 
agency, serve to incrementally undermine national sovereignty via spillover make 
much more of a punctual/circular process, a spiral. Indeed the spiral lacks precision, 
and therefore explanatory value with respect to the institutional outcome is not only 
more complicated, but limited. 
    However if observable outcomes serve to confirm a perpetuation of the spiral 
nature of the process, the theory continues to hold certain predictive value. 
    Supranational agency did indeed represent a decisive determinator of the process, 
even though the institutional outcome, does not provide for evidence for a substantial 
increase in supranational authority. 
    Moravcsik continously criticizes supranational schools of thought on the grounds 
of a rejection of the perception, that supranational institutions are part of the process. 
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He states, that "controlled tests reveal that supranational intervention, far from being a 
necessary condition for efficient interstate negotiation in the EC, is generally late, 
redundant, futile and sometimes even counterproductive."50 
    However the findings of my research on the process of the creation of ESM and the 
"Pact for the Euro" suggest, that Moravcsik is wrong. 
    With respect to supranational institutions as part of state integration as a process in 
the case of the ESM, I realize, that especially in this case where controversy among 
states is as serious as it prooved to be, supranational agency is relevant, even if 
delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies in the institutional outcome is 
minor. One can only speculate what the outcome of this process would have been, if 
the Commission was in the economist camp and would have supported the German, 
rather than the French position.  
    Most likely Greece would have left the EMU, and such a substantial pooling of 
funds would probably not have taken place. Presumably, there would not have been 
the political momentum to enhance the automatism of early sanctioning mechanisms 
of the SGP and to pursue the further integration of European economic policy, which 
after all has been a centerpiece of the Commission’s agenda ever since the creation of 
EMU as we know it today. 
    The Commission, at this point in time may not have acquired complete authority 
with respect to the realization of the ever closer economic and monetary union, but 
her political mission to initiate the process has been achieved, and her conceptual 
contributions have been and are contiously appreciated. 
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    Although the precise institutional design of ESM does not display considerable 
delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies, supranational agency has been a 
decisive factor in a process leading to the further pooling of sovereignty, and has 
successfully undermined independent national sovereignty. 
    I have to note, that with respect to the institutional outcome of the political process, 
that led to the creation of ESM in March 2011, the explanatory value of 
neofunctionalism as much as the explanatory value of intergovernmentalism are only 
modest at best. A pooling of funds and potential and factual sacrifices of national 
sovereignty have taken place, and supranational agency has been a decisive factor in 
this process just like intergovernmental bargaining. The agreement on the creation of 
ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" under the authority of intergovernmental bodies 
stands for the credibility of member states’ commitment to engage in a contious 
process of intergovernmental bargaining, which is supposed to lead to an integration 
of European economic and fiscal policy without further delegation of sovereignty to 
supranational bodies. 
    In support of neofunctionalism, there is evidence, that this progress in European 
integration can partly be explained as an endogenous process. Member states’ 
acknowledged, that decisions were needed in order to grant for the preservation of 
EMU and potentially the EU as a whole, and the fundamental systemic problem, as 
represented by the debate between monetarists and economists suggests the 
endogeneity of this deepening of European integration despite diametrical national 
preferences.  
    In support of liberal intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, it is however just as 
accurate to claim, that the agreement on a precise institutional outcome at this very 
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point in time would not have taken place without the pressing impact of external 
events.  
    A neofunctionalist automatism based on transnational socio-economic synergies 
(spillover) was absent as much as indicators of states’ recognition of issue-specific 
functional interdependence, as liberal intergovernmentalism would suggest. Rather 
member states’ general geopolitical interdependence appears to provide for the 
common (rather than convergent) interest in preserving EMU and the EU as a whole 
which ultimately led to the institutional outcome.  On the other hand divergent issue-
specific interests with respect to how to accomplish that goal determine the precise 
institutional design.  
    Neofunctionalist predictive capacity, which relies on the notion, that assertive 
supranational agency is the initiator of an incremental process leading states to 
sacrifice national sovereignty, retains a certain value. If the creation of ESM and the 
"Pact for the Euro" is understood as a step on the long route to integrated economic 
and fiscal policy, which I think it should be, then neofunctionalism is correct in 
assuming the relevance of supranational institutions in the normative process of 
European integration. Further, the fact, that member states’ final agreement was made 
under the existential pressure of the potential disintegration of EMU and the EU as a 
whole, not only supports the irreversibility and endogeneity of the process, but also 
the notion, that integration happens as a consequence of undesired effects of previous 
decisions. 
    Liberal intergovernmentalism on the other hand does provide for a certain 
explanatory value, but however fails to measure the dependent variable, since its 
focus on the institutional outcome limits its predictive capacity. While 
intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of relative bargaining power did indeed 
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determine the process, the final commitment despite being evidently credible did not 
lead to an institutional design that would entrust the Commission with substantially 
increased authority. The prediction, that national preferences would be reflectd in the 
institutional outcome holds true, yet according to the precise standards of liberal 
intergovernmentalist analysis the creation of ESM and the Euro does not represent a 
step in European integration. The creation of the SGP per se, back in 1996, does 
precisely fit liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, since its implementation had 
been assigned to the Commission after the agreement of bargaining member states. 
The ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" have been established to realize the integration 
of European economic and fiscal policy, just like the SGP, and although this new 
piece of legislation predominantly relies on intergovernmental settings as the 
institutional outcome, the process towards European integration has been advanced in 
the context of the SGP. 
    Max Pollack in a somewhat outdated, but however insightful article analysing the 
varying institutional settings and decision-making procedures across policy areas 
within the EU’s supranational and intergovernmental framework, notes, that "the 
argument presented above neither accepts nor rejects the conflicting claims of 
neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist theories;"51 and I would like to add that my 
argument as presented above does neither. 
    In this context Pollack cites Lowi on pluralist and elitist theories:"One way to deal 
with the extraordinary degree of inconsistency among the prevailing schools of 
thought is to abandon all (of them)...Another way is to embrace them all and then try 
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to find the limits of applicability of each...In short, once each puts an end to its claim 
to universality...it approaches the standards of scientific theory."44 
    I would therefore like to first identify the central common feature of both, which is 
the acknowledgement of the systemic relevance of socio-economic synergies across 
borders, and secondly condense the two theories to two central diametrical concepts 
of state integration: Supranationalism, and state-centrism. Further, I emphasize the 
distinction between integration as a process and integration as an outcome demanding 
evidence on the initiation and nature of the process on the one hand, and on the 
precise institutional design of a particular piece of legislation (such as the ESM) on 
the other.In any case explaining and predicting European integration will remain a 
puzzle, if not a riddle. My research on the process leading to the creation of ESM and 
the "Pact for the Euro" leads me to conclude, that the normativity of supranationalism 
was relevant to the process, but that the institutional outcome perpetuates the trend of 
an assertion of state-centrism with respect to future process. 
The Future 
    The recent crisis had brought the European project of the common currency to a 
pivotal moment in its history, and if the integration of economic and fiscal policy fails 
in the established intergovernmental setting of the "Pact for the Euro", the future of 
EMU and the EU as a whole is indeed open. 
    In an article in the May/June 2011 edition of Foreign Affairs, which was apparently 
written before the creation of ESM and which focusses on the EFSF, authors Henry 
Farrell and John Quiggin state, that the rigid strategy to cut deficit spending in 
European states as a means to stability would not only bear grave economic, but most 
importantly grave political consequences. "Dogmatically anti-inflationary" monetary 
policy, as represented by the CEB and as demanded by the union’s greatest net 
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contributor, Germany, would potentially lead to high unemployment, "more economic 
hardship", and ultimately "xenophobia"52. And indeed public opinion during the hot 
phase of the crisis in 2010 was characterized by resentiments in receiving as much as 
contributing states.  
    The political task at hand is undoubtedly challenging, and the Euro crisis forces 
states to act. This time bomb had been ticking for a while, and the explosion leaves 
the developed and comparatively wealthy states in Europe with the responsibility to 
after all provide for a meaningful political definition of European Union. Political 
processes in democratic states tend to be messy, however these fights have to be 
fought. Farrell and Quiggin predict, that if European integration continues to be 
associated with increasing economic hardship, then the project may fail politically 
due to intensified Euroscepticism among populations. It is in fact already observable, 
that in many of the European states, especially on the contributing side, such as 
France, the Netherlands, Finland or Austria, ultra-right wing parties, which 
traditionally campaign on Euroscepticism, have assumed parliamentary relevance and 
even enter governments in coalitions. On the other hand governments of receiving 
states continue to fail to implement austerity programmes, simply because they lose 
power, like in Portugal or Ireland. 
    Admittedly the situation is grim, and the future is uncertain. However Europe is not 
the only place, where the future is uncertain, and the political question is not only, 
whether the EMU member states will be able to compromise and provide for 
economic and monetary stability or if the EU will continue to exist, but also whether 
there is any politically feasible alternative.There are hardly any Western politicians or 
government officials left, who would not agree, that the welfare of a state is not 
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sustainable without sustainable fiscal spending.I suggest, that developed countries in 
the past have neglected the fact, that changes in the political and economic structure 
of the world have had a negative impact on the functionality and sustainability of 
democratic systems. 
    Not only the governments of Euro zone states such as Germany, France, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece or Italy, but also the United Kingdom and the United States have 
identified consolidated fiscal budgets as being without alternative. 
    The internal political processes, that naturally come along with austerity 
programmes are a given democratic reality, and democracies should do, what they 
were designed to do, namely to facilitate a societal compromise, that ensures the 
stability of the system. It would not have made a difference to Greece with respect to 
economic hardship and internal political strife, if they would have left EMU and 
resorted to a restructuring of their debt (which they may in fact do soon) without a 
European mechanism in place – the internal political situation would have been 
comparable, probably even worse.  
    I argue, that fiscal debt does not only represent a challenge to European integration, 
it in fact represents an enormous challenge to the democratic state per se. I claim, that 
transnational socio-economic dynamics, global economic interests, have served to 
undermine the functionality of virtually all democratic states, and ultra-right wing 
groups, nationalism and isolationism have been on the rise in the US as much as in 
Europe since the events of 2008. 
    Beyond European integration theorists have identified a structural problem caused 
by the internationalization of the market economy. I quote the American scholar 
Robert Gilpin: "Whereas the science of economics emphasizes the efficient allocation 
of scarce resources and the absolute gains enjoyed by everyone from economic 
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activities, state-centric scholars ... emphasize the distributive consequences of 
economic activities...."53 Robert Gilpin further identifies a "clash between the 
evolving economic and technical interdependence of national societies and the 
continuing compartmentalization of the world political system into sovereign 
independent states,"which in his view leads to an "inevitable clash between the logic 
of the market and the logic of the state."54 
    The Global market economy will stay with us for a while to come, simply because 
the world’s most powerful nations share an interest in upholding it. Democratic states’ 
only option to solve the political problem arising with the clash between the logic of 
the transnational market, and the logic of the sovereign nation state, is to integrate. 
    The history of the European common currency is closely tied to the history of 
globalization, and European economic and monetary integration is now more than 
ever a political rather than an economic mission. The recent decision to save the Euro, 
which implicitly represents a decision to save the EU, was motivated politically rather 
than economically, and it is fully consistent with a state-centric approach to 
integration. As long as global economic competition continues to determine 
individual states’ dependence and independence, European states will integrate as 
deeply as they must in order to preserve the democratic state system, while upholding 
open markets. 
    The process of European integration has not come to an end, despite countless 
moments of great turbulence, and internal strife. The year 2010 probably represented 
the most serious challenge to the European Union and the process of European 
integration since 1990, if not ever since its very beginning in the 1950s.The current 
institutional status of the highly turbulent process of economic and monetary 
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integration, namely the ESM and the "Pact for the Euro", will have to prove its utility, 
efficiency and legitimacy, but however stands for an expression of European states’ 
strong political commitment to face the future together, rather than to allow economic 
inequality and consequential political division to cause a potential repetition of 
history, and to limit the continents potential. 
    Further, given the fact, that since 1992 member states have asserted their 
institutional position vis-a-vis the European Commission, which itself is increasingly 
losing room for political function, I claim, that the more European states come to 
understand their general functional interdependence as neighboring democratic states 
in an economically and politically competitive global environment, the less 
politicalsignificance supranational institutions will have in the process. 
    European integration has in fact already reached a degree, which demands new 
theory in order to predict on the future process. I believe this theory should be state-
centric, and it should account for democratic states’ interest in preserving the 
democratic state per se while upholding transnational markets. 
    I find this notion to be supported by the fact, that the past 15 years or so have 
shown, that European legislative procedures have been revised in favor of 
intergovernmental settings on the one hand, and democratically elected supranational 
officials on the other. The problem with the political executive function of the 
Commission, which had been essential to the creation of the EEC, the EC and the 
SEA, is, that officials are not elected, and is therefore unsustainable as soon as a 
certain degree of integration has been achieved. 
    The process of European integration may indeed have started out as an elitist 
enterprise led by powerful producers’ commercial interests, but it has become much 
more than that. In my view it now represents an endeavour to save the democratic 
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system and the balance of the enlightened European society, while competing 
economically with politically incompatible states. There is no doubt, that the further 
process will lead to political friction in all member states, and there will be 
considerable external interest in sabotaging the project. New societal compromises in 
Europe will fiercely be fought for in the streets and parliaments, and there will be 
more elected and non-elected officials as much as interested actors blackmailing each 
other in nightly sessions. Yet, I am confident, that European electorates will come to 
the conclusion, that European leaders have come to before and on March 25, 2011, 
namely, that the European future demands compromise in any case, and that 
integration is without alternative. 
    Here is a set of assumptions that provide for solid predictive as much as 
explanatory capacity: 
    Europeans want to live in peace and prosperity, they know, that it is not possible to 
pursue that on their own, and they will find whatever form is necessary to accomplish 
that, just because there is no alternative. In my view, it is that simple.Theory is one 
thing, practice another, and European political leaders, especially in France and 
Germany tend to be member state representatives and supranational agents at the 
same time. 
    I quote Wolfgang Schaeuble, the current German Minister of Finance, and one of 
the last surviving political grand figures deeply involved in the process of European 
integration: "If we would not have European integration already, we would have to 
invent it." 
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